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The purpose of this essay to explore the relationships between the
simple and the complex in economics by anchoring our analysis on
bounded rationality. Much of the conventional literature focuses
on “un-bounded rationality” of the rationality-as-consistency va-
riety. Theorizing of bounded rationality tends to assume that the
problem to be solved is independent of the nature of bounded ra-
tionality. Following the insights from the works of Herbert Simon
and contributions from outside economics , both bounded ratio-
nality and the environment are inextricably linked. The bound-
aries between bounded rationality and its environment can shift.
The form in which bounded rationality is found depends on the
complexity of the environment. Furthermore, if local interactions
between bounded-rational agents result in the formation of hi-
erarchies - the complexity of the collective system will change.
Whether this will occur depends on the nature of bounded ratio-
nality at the individual level.
Keywords: Rationality, Bounded Rationality, Complexity
JEL Classification: B41, D01, D03
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Bounded Rationality and the Emergence of
Simplicity Amidst Complexity
Cassey Lee
“You cannot successfully use your technical knowledge unless you are a fairly
educated person, and, in particular, have some knowledge of the whole field
of the social sciences as well as some knowledge of history and philosophy.
Of course real competence in some particular field comes first. Unless you
really know your economics or whatever your special field is, you will be
simply a fraud. But if you know economics and nothing else, you will be a
bane to mankind, good, perhaps, for writing articles for other economists to
read, but for nothing else” F.A.Hayek (1991, p.38)
“We feel clearly that we are only now beginning to acquire reliable material
for welding together the sum total of all that is known into a whole; but on
the otherhand, it has become next to impossible for a single mind fully to
command more than a small specialized portion of it ... I can see no other
escape from this dilemma than that some of us should venture to embark
on a synthesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete
knowledge of some of them - and at the risk of making fools of ourselves”
Erwin Schrödinger (1967, p.1)
1 Introduction
The notion of rationality and the way in which it is assumed and applied in
economics is a much debated topic within the discipline itself and beyond.
The vast body of literature under the headings of ‘behavioral economics’ and
‘economics and psychology’ have attempted to make sense of the extent to
which and the manner in which rationality in reality differs from rationality
as it is assumed in economics. The term ‘bounded rationality’, which can
be traced back to Herbert Simon’s influential contributions in the 1950s, has
been used by many when referring to departures from the conceptualization
of rationality as consistency or rationality as maximization in mainstream
economic theory. Today, the notion of bounded rationality has a permanent
place in economics. Its impact has been profound in terms of our theoretical
and empirical understanding of decision making and judgement, markets,
organizations and institutions.
Parallel to the current research in mapping the boundaries of bounded ratio-
nality (to paraphrase Kahneman’s Nobel lecture title) is an increasingly in-
fluential line of research that attempts to transform economics, this time into
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a social science that embraces complexity theory. A core element within this
research programme is its focus on the emergence of complex structures from
micro-level interactions between relatively simple parts/elements/agents. An
analysis of how bounded rationality and complexity is related should be of
great interests to economists. Most economists are likely to agree on the
bounded rational nature of the human species as well as the complex nature
of the economy. Yet, these two aspects have often been considered and re-
searched separately with a few exceptions even though both are inextricably
linked. This is a key aspect of Herbert Simon’s ideas.
The purpose of this essay to explore the relationships between the simple and
the complex in economics by anchoring our analysis on bounded rationality.
The point of view taken in this paper is that bounded rationality and the
complexity of environment are both inextricably linked - that the emergence
of complex social structures would not possible without interactions between
bounded-rational agents, vice-versa. Furthermore, the bounded-rational na-
ture of agents is in itself a consequence of a complex environment. What this
implies in terms of a broader vision of economics is a topic worth exploring.
2 Rationality
The notion of rationality occupies a central position in modern economic the-
ory. Blaug (1992, p.230) opines that neoclassical economists regard the ra-
tionality postulate as part of the Lakatosian ‘hard core’ in their research pro-
gramme. Within choice theory, many have characterized rationality in terms
ofpreferences conforming to a set of axioms such as completeness, reflexiv-
ity, transitivity and continuity.1. Walsh (1996) has labeled this approach as
‘rationality as consistency’. Others have argued that the predominant view
of rationality is that of ‘rationality as maximization’ e.g. utility (or profit)
maximization 2. The two are related, that is, a ‘perfectly’ rational agent is
one exhibiting “consistent maximization of a well-ordered function” (Becker,
1962, p.1) or alternatively (and more generally), one who “makes decisions
consistently in pursuit of his own objectives” (Myerson, 1991, p.2). To schol-
ars from other disciplines, such views may seem to be a very narrow view of
human rationality. For the purpose of exploring the nature and implications
of departures from perfect rationality, it is perhaps useful to note that such
views were not always the predominant ones in economics.
1See for example, the formal exposition in Varian (1992), pp.94-95.
2See Arrow, 1986, pp.S388-390 and Simon, 1976, p.67
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In terms of ancestral views and visions, scholars point to a more ‘pragmatic’
notion of rationality adopted by Adam Smith in terms of “preferring more
to less” (Arrow, 1986, p.S388) and satisficing behavior described as “practi-
cal behavior of reasonable persons” (Simon, 2000, p.27). Elsewhere, Simon
(1997, p.6) suggests that rationality, in so far as it can be inferred from
Adam Smith’s works, can be interpreted to mean “having reasons for what
you do”. An interesting and related issue in discussions on rationality is the
role of self-interest. Simon (1997, p.7) provides such an interpretation: “...the
economic actors are certainly behaving rationally - that is, pursing what is
they suppose to be their self-interest.” In this regard, Sen (1977) has argued
for a need to go beyond this conceptualization of rationality as self-interest.
This brings in the question of ethics and morality and their relationship to
rationality. Walsh (1996), for example, cites Hilary Putnam’s observation
that “our values of equality, intellectual freedom, and rationality, are deeply
connected”.3
Beyond the classical economics period or rather at the tail end of it, it can
perhaps be argued that the notion of rationality underwent further narrow-
ing in the form of utilitarianism in the 1850s and 1860s and later in the
form of the marginal utility doctrine via the works of Stanley Jevons, Carl
Menger and Leon Walras in the 1870s.4 The next significant development
was the formulation of demand/preference theory based upon an ordinal in-
terpretation of utility - indifference curves via Fisher and Pareto in the 1890s,
consumer behavior based on ordinal utility via Hicks and Allen in 1934 and
Samuelson’s weak axiom of revealed preference in the late 1930s 5. These
developments were crucial in establishing the basic axioms underlying the
rationality-as-consistency approach in choice theory.
The 1930s also saw the beginnings of a dramatic transformation of economics
of a different sort, namely the axiomatization of economic theory via the
works of John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and Abraham Wald. After
the Second World War, the axiomatic method gained a permanent foothold
in economic theory through general equilibrium analysis and social choice
theory in the 1950s.6 One interpretation of these developments (hopefully not
a too naive one), is that the sanctity or unassailability of the rationality-as-
3The discussions in Smith (2003) seem to hint at the possible gains from further exam-
ining, first the broad views held by Scottish philosophers such as David Hume and Adam
Smith, and second, more specifically, an integrated view of Smith’s visions on rationality
inferred from the Wealth of Nations and the Moral Sentiments.
4We rely on Blaug (1985) for this and the following narrative.
5See Blaug (1985, Ch.9) and Blume and Easley (2008, p.2)
6See Ingrao and Israel (1990) and Giocoli (2003).
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consistency view in economics was further entrenched by the axiomatization
of economic theory.
Apart from these developments, two other developments that are usually
mentioned in discussing rationality in modern economics, namely, game the-
ory and rational expectations. Formal treatments of game theory dates as far
back as 1912 in the form of Ernst Zermelo’s work followed by the ‘subjective’
approach by von Neumann and Nash in the 1940s-1050s (Vellupilai, 2009,
p.1411). Rational expectations was first proposed by John Muth in 1961 and
developed later by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent in the 1970s. What
are the notions of rationality associated with these developments?
The discussions on the notion of rationality in game theory have centered
around a number of issues. These relate to whether the axioms underlying a
given game characterize a rational person e.g. agents maximize or minimax-
ing payoffs and the efficient division of the game’s surplus (Simon, 1991a,
p.2 and Samuelson, 1996, p.19). Rationality in game theory has also been
related to the ability of agents to undertake long backward-induction calcu-
lations in extensive form games (Simon, 1991a, p.24). Not only are agents
(players) in game theory usually assumed to be perfectly rational, such ra-
tionality is assumed to be common knowledge (known to all players).7 In
contrast, evolutionary game theory does away with any assumption of maxi-
mizing but this problem is not really addressed as the players in such theories
do not correspond to individual players (Aumann, 1997, p.5). Overall, the
notion of rationality remains an open problem within game theory. Many
scholars have advocated the usefulness of incorporating bounded rational-
ity in game theory albeit there are disagreements about how this should be
accomplished. For example, commenting on a preliminary draft of Ariel Ru-
binstein’s book on modeling bounded rationality, Herbert Simon advocates
an approach anchored “careful observation and experimentation” rather than
“casual observations” (Rubinstein, 1998, p.188).
In rational expectations, discussions on the notion of rationality center around
how agents confront uncertainty about the future. In this regard, the stan-
dard assumptions are ones in which “people behave in ways that maximize
their utility (their enjoyment of life) or profits” and “outcomes do not dif-
fer systematically (i.e., regularly or predictably) from what people expected
7A number of paradoxes arise out of the common knowledge assumption, the solution
to which lies in distinguishing between outcome of a game and the assumptions on agents’
behavior. See Dekel and Gul (1997) and the Autumn issue of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 1992.
4
them to be”.8 The former suggests that agents in rational expectations are
fully rational in the sense of maximizing. The latter implies that uncertainty
is removed from agents by assuming that all of them know the correct model
of the economy (Simon, 1991a, p.8).9 The consequence of this is that agents
are able to predict the future with accuracy, thus enabling them to behave
in a substantively rational manner (Simon, 1976, p.79).
3 Bounded Rationality
3.1 Bounded Rationality: Origins
Within economics, there have been some interests in departing from the
notion of ‘perfect rationality’ (either in the form of rationality as consistency
or rationality as maximization). To date, there is no consensus on the form
in which such departures should assume in theoretical models (a normative
issue). This is encapsulated by Frank Hahn remarks that “there is only one
way to be perfectly rational, while there are an infinity of ways to be partially
rational ... where do you set the dial of rationality?”.10 To further muddle
this debate, the theoretical and empirical responses to this challenge in terms
of departures from rationality have been variously labeled as nonrational,
irrational and bounded rational.11 Amongst these terms, the most often
used one is that of bounded rationality.
The notion of ‘bounded rationality’ can be traced back to the pioneering
work of Herbert Simon beginning in the 1950s. In an early work, Simon
(1955) embarked on an attempt to drastically revise the concept of economic
man by paying attention to the limits in the information and computational
capacities of an economic man:
8Thomas J. Sargent. ”Rational Expectations.” The Concise Encyclopedia of Eco-
nomics. 2008. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved October 4, 2010 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RationalExpectations.html
9This is similar to the common knowledge assumption in game theory. The correct
model of the economy is “common knowledge” amongst agents in the macroeconomy.
10See Waldrop (1992, p.92).
11Do these terms refer to different things? Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) defines irra-
tionality in terms of discrepancies between a norm and human judgement (e.g. in terms
of optimization, probability and utilities - elements of what is known as substantive ra-
tionality). In contrasts with irrationality, models of bounded rationality dispenses with
these types of human judgement. In fact, bounded rationality is considered to be related
to nonrationality.
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“Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of
economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible
with the access to information and the computational capacities
that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the
kinds of environments in which such organisms exist.” (p.99)
Thus, the term ‘bounded rationality’ can be interpreted to mean rational
choice under computational constraints (Simon, 1955, p.101). Within this
interpretation, satisficing, in Simon’s words, are ‘approximating procedures’
or “simplifications the choosing organism may deliberately introduce into its
model of the situation in order to bring the model within the range of its
computing capacity” (ibid, p.100). In the paper, in addition to the incorpo-
ration of simpler (discrete) pay-off functions, Simon introduced information
gathering which improves the precision of behavior-outcome mapping. The
notion of ‘aspiration level’ was also introduced with the view that this can
change depending on the ease of discovering satisfactory alternatives (ibid,
p.111).12
Simon’s emphasis on the computational foundations of decision making were
probably further reinforced after 1955 when he became more involved in
research on problem-solving in cognitive psychology and computer science
(artificial intelligence).13 By the 1970s, the term ‘procedural rationality’ was
used to denote a concept of rationality which focused on “the effectiveness of
the procedures used to choose actions” (Simon, 1978, p.9) where the process
of choice is important (ibid, p.2 and Simon, 1976, p.131). This is different
from the notion of ‘substantive rationality’ found in concepts such as ‘ratio-
nality as maximization’ or ‘rationality as consistency’ where choice is entirely
determined by the agent’s goals subject to constraints (and consistency re-
quirements). Since the goals of agents are either assumed (maximizing util-
ity) or are embedded in the axioms of preferences, the focus of substantive
rationality lies in the results of rational choice. In discussing the concept of
procedural rationality, Simon (1976, pp.72-73) also highlighted the impor-
tance of using heuristics as means of selectively searching the “immense tree
of move possibilities”. Furthermore, Simon (1978, p.12) attempted to relate
the two concepts of satisficing and heuristics to the theories of computational
complexity (which emerged in the 1960s) and heuristic search:
12It is interesting to note that at this juncture Simon used the term ‘approximate ra-
tionality’ in his concluding remarks. Klaes and Sent (2005, p.37) suggests that the term
‘bounded rationality’ is likely to have been first used in Simon (1957).
13This change in Simon’s research focus is discussed in Simon (1982, p.401) and Simon
(1991b, p.189).
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“One interesting and important direction of research in computa-
tional complexity lies in showing how the complexity of problems
might be decreased by weakening the requirements for solution -
by requiring solutions only to approximate the optimum, or by
replacing an optimality criterion by a satisficing criterion.”
“The theory of heuristic search is concerned with devising or iden-
tifying search procedures that will permit systems of limited com-
putational capacity to make complex decisions and solve difficult
problems. When a task environment has patterned structure, so
that solutions are not scattered randomly throughout it, but are
located in ways related to the structure, then an intelligent sys-
tem capable of detecting the pattern can exploit it in order to
search for solutions in a highly selective way.”
3.2 Bounded Rationality: Empirical and Theoretical
Developments
The rich ideas of Simon not withstanding, it took another decade, namely
in the late 1980s, before bounded rationality received significant attention
within economics (Klaes and Sent, 2005, p.45). Even so, not all researchers
whether they are empiricists (which includes experimentalists) or theoreti-
cians used the term ‘bounded rationality’ in the same manner. Within the
empriricists/experimentalists camp, which originated from the field of psy-
chology, the early work on heuristics and biases by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) made no reference to Simon work. This could be due to the distinc-
tion that they make between reasoning and intuitive thoughts, the latter
being more important to judgements and choices (Kahneman, 2003, p.1450).
Simon does not seem to have made this distinction even though he did ac-
knowledge the importance of the unconscious: “ ... we cannot rule out the
possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker than the con-
scious” (Simon, 1955, p.104). In Kahneman’s Nobel lecture, he describes his
work with Tversky as an exploration of the psychology of intuitive beliefs and
choices and an examination of their bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003,
p.1449). However, in their seminal works, explicit references to bounded
rationality were only made in discussing framing effects (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1981, p.458). Much of the body of research carried out under the
banner of “Behavioral Economics” or “Economics and Psychology” were de-
voted to testing departures from elements of substantive rationality such as
complete preferences, expected utility, Bayesian updating and exponential
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discounting, amongst others (see Camerer (1998) and Rabin (1998)). This
can also be inferred in the following remarks in Rabin (1998, fn.1) which
could be interpreted as a reference to Simon’s approach:
“Another topic I have omitted is “non-psychological” models of
bounded rationality. Researchers have formulated models of bounded
rationality (based on intuition, computer science, or artificial in-
telligence) meant to capture cognitive limits of economic actors,
but which do not invoke research on the specific patterns of errors
that human beings make.”
On the theoretical front, a number of different approaches to modeling bounded
rationality have been adopted since the 1980s. To make sense of the litera-
ture, it is perhaps useful to try to classify the diverse models and methods
that have been used to theorize some of the implications of bounded ratio-
nality.
One approach originates from the efforts by mathematicians and computer
scientists to understand the foundation of mathematics as well as the na-
ture and limits of computation. The origins of computability theory can be
traced back to two monumental works in the 1930s. In 1931, Kurt Gödel
shattered the Hilbertian program of attempting to derive all mathematics
from a complete and consistent set of axioms. Gödel showed that there are
true statements within such systems that are not provable. For the the-
ory of computation, this result implies that “there are some functions on the
integers that cannot be represented by an algorithm - that is, cannot be com-
puted” (Russell and Norvig, 1995, p.11). This was to be followed by Alan
Turing’s proof that there are some functions that even powerful computing
devices (such as the Universal Turing Machine) cannot compute.
The body of literature known as ‘computable economics’ and ‘algorithmic
economics’ associated with the works of K. Vela Velupillai represent, perhaps,
the most sustained application of computability theory to economics.14 Sur-
prisingly, there has been very little discussions on bounded rationality within
a computability framework. Exceptions include Velupillai (2000) and Vellupi-
lai (2010). Both works advanced several important points. The modeling of
bounded rationality algorithmically (e.g. via the use of Turing machines)
14These terms were coined by K.Vela Velupillai. Early contributors who have applied
computability theory to decision making problems include Michael Rabin, Alain Lewis
and Preston McAfee (see Velupillai, 2000, p.17). Other contributors in the 1980s include
Luca Anderlini and Kislaya Prasad.
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implies that choice and decision-making are intrinsically dynamic processes.
Equally important, bounded rationality is not a constrained version (or a
special case) of rationality in the so-called ‘Olympian models’ (in our par-
lance, models where agents are fully-rational). Rather, bounded rationality
should be perhaps considered as the general case and full-rationality a special
case.
Another line of theoretical approach to bounded rationality that is related
to computational theory but is different from the computability approach
discussed above, involves the use of finite state automata to model limits to
strategies that players can employ in games.15 Early pioneers include Ney-
man (1985) and Rubinstein (1986). In these works, each player is assumed
to employ an automaton (often a Moore machine) to play the game. Here,
‘bounded rationality’ can be interpreted in terms of limits to the number of
states of the automaton. Such limits can either be exogenously determined
(as in Neyman) or endogenously determined (as in Rubinstein). In the latter
case, the number of states in the automaton is determined by a trade-off
between the cost of maintaining such states and payoffs from a repeated
game.
Another automata-based approach which is closer to ‘applied’ computational
theory or computational complexity theory is that of Gilboa (1988) and Ben-
Porath (1990). In contrast the works of Neyman and Rubinstein, which
looks at complexity of implementation, these works consider the complexity
of computational involved in selecting strategies. Here, the analysis of the
complexity of computation involves assessing the amount of resources (such
as time and memory) required to solve computational problems. This is
analyzed in terms of whether a polynomial time algorithm exists to solve a
given computation problem such as Nash equilibrium. Overall, the results
obtained suggest that Nash equilibria can be hard to compute (i.e. requires
non-polynomial time) except for restricted cases (e.g. anonymous opponents
and graphical structures).16 What of bounded rationality within a computa-
tional complexity context? Roughgarden (2010, p.231) argues that:
“For equilibrium computation problems, polynomial-time solv-
ability correlates well with efficient learnability and has an ap-
15See Aumann (1997) for a good summary and Chatterjee and Sabourian (2008) for a
more extensive survey.
16For a recent summary of the state of art research in this area, see Daskalakis et al.
(2009) and Kalai (2009). The fact that both tend to be mutually exclusively applied in
economic theory reflects the difficulties encountered in reconciling both within a single
modeling exercise, as Roughgarden (2010, p.210) has argued.
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pealing interpretation in terms of boundedly rational participants.
While the exact definition of hard varies with the nature of the
problem, all such hardness results suggest that no fast and general
algorithm will be discovered, motivating the study of heuristics,
distributional analyses, domain-specific special cases, and alter-
native, more tractable equilibrium concepts.”
The above remarks suggest that questions pertaining to the hardness of solv-
ing a problem, ways of reducing this hardness and the nature of the problem
to be solved are inextricably linked. This insight is not entirely new and can
be found in some of Herbert Simon’s earliest published works. It provides a
call for a reconsideration of how bounded rationality should be framed.
4 Bounded Rationality and the Complexity
of Environment
4.1 Some Early Views From Simon
Herbert Simon’s seminal 1955 paper that contained his early ideas of bounded
rationality was followed by an equally interesting paper that was published a
year later. In the paper, Simon (1956, p.120) articulated the importance of
considering the environment within which bounded rational agents operate:
“A great deal can be learned about rational decision making by
taking into account, at the outset, the limitations upon the capac-
ities and complexity of the organism, and by taking into account
of the fact that the environments to which it must adapt pos-
sesses properties that permit further simplification of its choice
mechanisms.”
This line of thinking continued to preoccupy Simon and his collaborator,
Allen Newell, in their subsequent work. For example, an entire chapter
(three) in Newell and Simon (1972) was devoted to the ‘task environment’
defined as “an environment coupled with a goal, problem, or task”. The
centrality of the interdependence between bounded rationality and the task
environment is clearly articulated in the book using a scissors metaphor rem-
iniscence of Marshall’s use of the same metaphor for demand and supply:
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“Just as a scissors cannot cut without two blades, a theory of
thinking and problem solving cannot predict behavior unless it
encompasses both an analysis of the structure of task environ-
ments and an analysis of the limits of rational adaptation to task
requirements.” (Newell and Simon, 1972, p.55)
In their theory, the locus of the links and interactions between the exter-
nal environment and bounded rationality is the ‘problem space’ which is
described as “the space in which his problem solving activities takes place”
(Newell and Simon, 1972, p.59) This problem space is not exogenously given
but is something that is derived internally (within the agent’s mind) via
the construction of an internal representation of the task environment (ibid,
p.59).
Another interesting point that Newell and Simon make is the possibility of
shifting the boundary between the problem solver (as an information process-
ing system or IPS) and the environment (ibid, p.81) - which is accompanied
by the need for another parameter, namely the intelligence of the problem
solver (ibid, p.82). A reading of Newell and Simon (1972, pp.81-82) suggests
that intelligence is related to the predictive abilities of a problem solver,
which in turn can only be defined in terms of the type (or classes) of envi-
ronment in which such abilities are valid. In an intriguing discussion of an
extreme case of shifting such boundaries, Newell and Simon suggests that:
“We must exercise caution, however, in shifting the boundary
between problem solver and environment. If we move particular
operators and classify them with the task environment, there is
a danger that a problem solver will disappear entirely, and that
there will be no room at all for a theory of him.” (ibid, p.81)
This is indeed what the literature on situated or embodied cognition seems to
imply (Anderson, 2003). The other extreme would be of course, to shift the
boundary entirely away from the environment which perhaps have an equally
disturbing implication that there is actually no problem to be solved except
for that which exists in the mind of the problem solver! Another interesting
point that Newell and Simon (1972, pp.93-94) make is the possibility of
employing methods to reduce the problem space that needs to be explored
to find a solution. After employing such methods, the agent will be left with
a irreducible problem space that has to be examined in its entirety.
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4.2 Some Recent Developments
The vision on the interdependence between bounded rationality and the en-
vironment within which decisions are made continue to find resonance in
contemporary views:
“Models of bounded rationality describe how a judgement or deci-
sion is reached (that is, the heuristic processes or proximal mech-
anisms) rather than merely the outcome of the decision, and they
describe the class of environments in which these heuristics will
succeed or fail.” (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p.4)
The emphasis on context/environment suggests that there has to be a match-
ing between the decision/judgement processes that are used and the struc-
ture/complexity of the environment (problems) to which they are applied.
The term ‘ecological rationality’ has been used by Vernon Smith to denote
this heuristic-environment matching. This can contrasted with the term
“constructivist rationality” in which social institutions are created ‘top-down’
by what Smith (2003, p.467) describes as “conscious deductive processes of
human reason”.
What are the sources of ecological rationality and how do they come about?
Vernon Smith (2003, p.469) suggests that such order “emerges out of cultural
and biological evolutionary processes”. The diverse views on the subject mat-
ter seem to suggest that our current state of knowledge in this area is far
from complete and definitive. For example, there are at least five different
views/theories on this subject, namely sociobiology, human behavioral ecol-
ogy, evolutionary psychology, memetics and gene-culture co-evolution (La-
land and Brown, 2002).
Following a co-evolutionary line of argument and perhaps inspired by similar
views advanced by Simon (1956) and Newell and Simon (1972), it can be
perhaps be further argued that the bounded rational nature of the human
species is inextricably linked to the complexity of the environment. This is
put forward succinctly by Gigerenzer (2001, p.5):
“Simple heuristics can succeed by exploiting the structure of in-
formation in an environment. In other words, the environment
can do part of the work for the heuristic.”
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A similar view is advanced by Rubinstein (1998, p.3) on the relationship
between formal social institutions and decision-making:
“Many social institutions, like standard contracts and legal pro-
cedures, exist, or are structured as they are, in order to simplify
decision making”
Furthermore, the bounded rational nature of humans also leads to the for-
mation of formal and non-formal social structures and relationships (e.g.
markets, non-markets, organizations, institutions, norms, conventions) that
not only affect the choice and efficacy of ‘approximating procedures’ (to use
Simon’s terminology) but are themselves outcomes of such procedures:
“Rules emerge as a spontaneous order - they are found - not delib-
erately designed by one calculating mind. Initially constructivist
institutions undergo evolutionary change adapting beyond the
circumstances that gave them birth. What emerges is a form of
“social mind” that solves complex organization problems without
conscious cognition. This “social mind” is born of the interaction
among all individuals through the rules of institutions that have
to date survived cultural selection processes.” (Smith (2003),
p.500)
Thus, what emerges is a social structure that acts as a collective problem-
solving mechanism that sometimes complements and substitutes the judge-
ment and decision processes at the individual level. Here, we recognize the
ability of bounded-rational agents to partake in some rational constructions
that can further adapt and evolve, sometimes in unpredictable directions
(this is a view articulated by Vernon Smith). This also extends to more tacit
social constructions/relations such as norms and conventions. For example,
Conlisk (1996, p.677) suggests that:
“Norms might be the cause of bounds on individualistic ratio-
nality. Or norms might be the effect of bounded rationality ...
docility to social norms improves economic fitness by inducing
people to augment their limited rationality with the collective
wisdom of their social group.”
Such ideas also seem to be related to what Arrow (1986) considers to be
Adam Smith’s profound insight captured in the invisible hand metaphor:
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“Actually, the classical view had much to say about the role of
knowledge, but in a very specific way. It emphasized how a com-
plete price system would require individuals to know very little
about the economy other than their own private domain of pro-
duction and consumption. The profoundest observation of Smith
was that the system works behind the backs of the participants;
the directing “hand” is “invisible.” Implicitly, the acquisition of
knowledge was taken to be costly.” (p.S391)
The invisible hand metaphor has been the subject of market experiments for
some time. An early example is Smith (1962), who provided experimental ev-
idence that price adjustments were not consistent with that associated with
a Walrasian tântonnement and that a decentralized trading system could
bring about economic equilibrium. Perhaps, even more startling, Gode and
Sunder (1993) showed that allocative efficiency can be achieved in markets
populated by traders with zero intelligence. Aside from these works, there
have been other attempts by economists to discuss and model decentral-
ized (micro-level) interactions, often incorporating some form of departures
from full-rationality. Kirman (2003, p.22) emphasizes the importance of de-
centralized market interactions involving individuals with “limited reasoning
and calculating capacities”. Both Kirman (1997) and Axtell (2007) argue
that a fruitful way forward is to model decentralized interactions within net-
works. In a later paper, Kirman et al. (2007) modeled the self-organization of
social networks via the assumption of bounded rational agents in a ‘spatially
myopic sense’ (i.e. capable of interacting with only a subset of neighbors).
An issue that arise in virtually all these works is the the emergence of pat-
terns arising from local interactions albeit without sufficient attention paid
to the computational aspects whether from a computability or a computa-
tional complexity point of view. On this issue, it is perhaps useful to note
recent attempts to deal with some of the computational theoretical problems
associated with general equilibrium theory. Whilst Axtell (2005) argued that
the Walrasian general equilibrium is an implausible conception given the dif-
ficulty (NP hard) to compute it. In an even more devastating critique of
the theory, Velupillai (2006) argued that the standard CGE model is not
computable. In other words, since the equilibrium in a GE model cannot
even be computed (solved algorithmically without any resource constraints)
- there is not much point in even discussing the computational complex-
ity of the problem (or computation under resource constraints). This is a
distinction between what is solvable in principle (computable) and what is
solvable in practice (tractable). A non-computable problem cannot be solved
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at all whilst a computable problem may not be solvable in practice i.e. in-
tractable.(See Davis et al. (1994, p.444)).
Clearly, the topic on the relationship between bounded rationality and the en-
vironment requires further research especially from more empirical evidence
(anchored within a information processing and computational framework) as
well as theoretical explorations along the lines of computability and compu-
tational complexity. The full richness and relevance of Simon and Newell’s
vision on the subject can be seen from other disciplines. A particularly fruit-
ful area of research involves the study of decision-making in social insects.
Interesting results include ant colonies that exhibits optimal decision-making
(e.g. Edwards and Pratt, 2009) and that can even solve NP-hard problems
such as the Travelling Salesman Problem (Dorigo and Gambardella, 1997).
Even more intriguing are perhaps studies on colony-level cognition where in-
ternal representation of cognition are found in individual insects and their
interactions with each other (Marshall and Franks, 2009). Within social
insect colonies, mutually interacting populations must reach an activation
threshold before a decision takes place. Similar to the role played by Simon’s
satificing concept, the decision threshold “can be varied to to achieve either
quick but inaccurate, or accurate but slow decisions” (Marshall and Franks,
2009, p.R395). Empirical observations in this area have been accompanied
by computational complexity-based modeling (of the Crutchfield statistical
complexity variety) e.g. Delgado and Sole (1997).
There has been little interests in drawing lessons from such studies for eco-
nomics, perhaps because many economists would consider ants are way too
different (‘less intelligent’ or complex?) than humans. Kirman (1993) is a
rare exception. In his paper, Alan Kirman emphasizes on how asymmetric
outcomes (e.g. herding) can ‘emerge’ from stochastic interactions between
symmetric (identical) and simple agents (ants). Another interesting feature
of Kirman’s model is the analysis of equilibrium as a process where the only
meaningful characterization would be in terms of the “equilibrium distribu-
tion of the process”. One interesting question that comes to mind is whether
the shifting of the boundaries between the problem solver and environment
might entail a trade-off between centralization and decentralization in a par-
allel information processing system. How then would a shift change com-
putational complexity of the colony? A question of a similar spirit can also
be ask about the computability of such a system. Finally, such discussions
also compel us to ponder another question - whether it might be useful to
consider how ‘simplicity’ as in bounded rationality can emerge and co-evolve
with a changing complex environment.
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5 The Emergence of Simplicity
Amidst Complexity
5.1 The Complexity of Organisms and Environment
Complexity and complex system are issues that have preoccupied scholars for
a long time including Herbert Simon. After publishing two seminal papers
that articulated the idea and importance of bounded rationality and how
they relate to the environment (Simon (1955) and Simon (1956)), Herbert
Simon went on to publish a paper titled “The Architecture of Complexity”
in 1962. In a sense, Simon’s interests in complexity and complex systems is
a natural extension of his earlier works published since the mid-1950s. In
Simon (1955, p.101), the “levels of computational complexity” was an is-
sue raised in relation to bounded rationality (in terms of the employment of
‘schemes of approximation’). Furthermore, not only is an organism complex
(Simon, 1956, p.129), the choice process associated with bounded rationality
can differ in terms of different degree of rationality (ibid, p.133). In addition,
the ‘complexity’ of the environment also matters. In Simon’s example involv-
ing the case of an organism seeking food, the ‘complexity’ of the environment
matters. This was discussed in terms of the richness of randomly distributed
food points and the density of paths (leading to them) (ibid, p.131). In ad-
dition, Simon also noted that learning could enhance an organism’s survival
if food points are not randomly distributed such that clues to their location
exists along paths leading to them (ibid, p.135).
To discuss the issue of the complexity (or simplicity) of an organism and its
environment, a more precise way to defining complexity is needed. One such
approach would be to use Kolgomorov Complexity (or algorithmic informa-
tion content) to measure complexity. The Kolgomorov Complexity K of an
object is measured by the smallest program that can be used to compute it.
A random object of length n would have a maximum K number equal to n.
In contrast, an object comprising a string of n ones is relatively low (with
K approximately equal to log n). The next challenge is to decide what to
measure - the physical/biological or behavioral aspects of an organism. It
is a difficult question to address as it leads to deep questions such as those
relating to the roles of biological and cultural evolution. Both are related as
an organism’s capacity to learn, produce and transmit knowledge is likely to
be biologically constrained to some extent.
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5.2 Bounded Rationality and the Environment
In the model used in Simon (1956), the organism is assumed to have a fixed
aspiration level (in terms of maintaining average food intake rather than
maximizing) and an ability to see a finite number of moves ahead. When food
points are randomly distributed, these two characteristics of the organism is
sufficient to ensure a higher survival probability for the organism than when
it behaves randomly. This example suggests that when the environment
is maximally Kolgomorov complex (randomly distributed food points), the
organism is likely to be found to be using decision procedures that are less
than maximal Kolgomorov complex.17
What if food points are not randomly distributed and, in addition, clues on
the distribution of food points can be detected by the organism? In such a
case, Simon argued that the adoption of a systematic exploration strategy
(i.e. heuristics) is associated with a higher survival probability than a com-
pletely random behavior. This suggests that it pays (in terms of survival
probability) for organisms to be less than maximal Kolgomorov complex
when the environment is also less than maximal Kolgomorov complex (i.e.
food points are not randomly distributed). An important issue to consider is
whether some degree of randomness must be present in to ensure survivability
especially in a changing environment.
The above discussions suggest that not only is bounded rationality (as in
less than maximal Kolgomorov complex) may be more prevalent, the form in
which it takes (satisficing, heuristics or both) depends on the nature of the
environment i.e. heuristics involving learning to exploit some systematic fea-
ture of the environment. The prevalence of bounded rationality could also
be interpreted to mean that the type of ‘Olympian rationality’ commonly
assumed in many mainstream economics models is indeed a special case (as
Vellupilai (2010) has argued) i.e. precisely because the spectrum encompass-
ing the collection of choice procedures are obviously less than that associated
with maximal Kolgomorov complexity. It is a special case where the organ-
ism has no constraints in terms of its ability to look forward (full knowledge
of how food points are distributed) and/or is a maximizer (searching the
entire problem space).
17In the paper, the food points appear to be distributed over a graph-theoretic (regular)
tree (in Simon’s words, “branching system of paths”, ibid, p.131). There is a need to
differentiate between the Kolgomorov complexity measureK of a regular graph tree (which
is low) and the Kolgomorov complexity of the randomly distributed food points (which is
high). The latter suggests that the Kolgomorov complexity of the environment facing the
organism is high.
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Would such interpretations differ in the case of organisms undertaking par-
allel information processing such as social insects? Going back to the earlier
example, the employment of random foraging strategies (high K) under par-
allel information processing conditions (and in an environment where food
points are randomly distributed) could be enough to ensure survivability of
the colony. Does this mean that less complex choice procedures under paral-
lel information processing work as well as complex choice procedures under
serial information processing?18 This may be a wrong comparison (question)
as random foraging behavior within social insect colonies may not necessarily
be less complex. Why? The collective computations undertaken by social
insects, even though based on simple choice procedures (e.g. randomizing) at
the individual level, may be interpreted (as many have done) as an emergent
property. Thus, if it can be shown that the Kolgomorov complexity measure
of the resulting ‘collective choice procedures’ (K ′) is actually lower. Can this
be true? Can a collective choice procedure, comprising of individual choice
procedure with high Ks, have a lower K ′? It is possible that the Kolgo-
morov complexity of parallel information processing systems may be lower
even without any emergent properties. For example, the average lower bound
Kolgomorov complexity of a sequential sorting of n elements is in the order
of 1
2
log n whereas that of a parallel stacks is
√
n (Vitanyi, 2007). However,
could emergent properties in such systems (provided they exist) drive the
Kolgomorov complexity even lower?
5.3 Emergence and Hierarchies
There is currently no definition of the term ‘emergence’ that is universally ac-
cepted in the academic research community across different disciples. Some
refer to emergence as a “property of a system not reducible to, nor readily pre-
dictable from the properties of individual system components” (Halley and
Winkler, 2008, p.10). Some have emphasized emergence as a “process that
leads to the appearance of a structure not directly described by the defin-
ing constraints and instantaneous forces that control a system” (Crutchfield,
1994, p.12). Others consider emergence as involving the detection of “some
new feature that makes the overall description of the system simpler than it
was before” (Deguet et al., 2006, p.24).
Instead of trying to reconcile these definition, it might be perhaps more
useful to discuss theoretically how emergence might occur. To begin with,
18Perhaps even better given that social insects have been around and may be around
longer than humans!
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emergence is an outcome of local interactions between large number of com-
ponents of the system. Such local or micro-level interactions lead to the
formation of spatio-temporal patterns or properties at the global or macro-
level. Obviously, not all local-level interactions lead to emergence. In system
with emergent properties, local interactions have been described as ‘non-
trivial’ in the sense that they result in a reduction in the degrees of free-
dom (Prokopenko et al., 2008, p.11). This is similar to Simon (1962, p.476)
description of ‘strong interactions’ which not only reduces the capacity the
components to interact further but leads to the formation of sub-systems that
interact weakly amongst themselves. Thus, systems with emergent proper-
ties are hierarchic systems (in the sense of being “composed of interrelated
sub-systems”) with the property of ‘near-decomposability’ (where the sys-
tem can be described at the aggregate or macro-level in terms of the weak
interactions between the sub-systems (ibid, p.468 and 478). Furthermore,
“only the aggregate properties of their parts enter into the description of the
interactions of those part” (Simon, 1962, p.478). This would also imply that
the Kolgomorov complexity of the system at the macro-level is actually lower
(as argued earlier). It should also be noted that Simon has attempted to op-
erationalize the strength of interactions in terms of frequency interactions,
an idea which has some resonance in institutional economics (Williamson,
2000).
What are implications of such views on bounded rationality? First, bounded
rationality relates to micro-level interactions in complex social systems. Since
there is diversity in the degree of complex social systems across time and
space, the complexity of any (social) system may be found in the nature of
bounded rationality of organisms/agents in that system. This in turn affects
the type of interactions in the system - whether they are non-trivial or not
- with consequence on the formation or non-formation of hierarchies. For
example, the response threshold to stimuli (read bounded rationality, satis-
ficing) of each individual will affect the emergence of collective phenomena in
social insects. A even more challenging question is what drives bounded ra-
tionality. From an evolutionary point of view, the prevailing form of bounded
rationality would have been subject to selection within a given environment.
Thus the degree of ‘simplicity’ that is associated with bounded rationality
would be inextricably linked to the environment. This has led some schol-
ars to identify “genomic complexity with the the amount of information a
sequence stores about its environment” (Adami et al., 2000, p.4463).
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6 Concluding Remarks
The predominant view of rationality in economics today is one of ‘rationality
as consistency’ or ‘rationality as maximizing’. Whilst departures from such
notions of Olympian rationality (to paraphrase Professor Velupillai) do get
some attention in the research community in the form of bounded rationality,
the resulting body of research is one that mostly either treats bounded ratio-
nality as constrained form of rationality (therefore a special case) or is devoid
of the rich computational implications suggested in Herbert Simon’s original
works. Furthermore, a key insight of Simon’s work is missing - that of the
inter-dependence between the problem solver and his/her environment.
On this, several important insights can be derived from Simon’s work as
well as other recent contributions from outside economics. The boundaries
between bounded rationality and its environment can shift. The form and
degree of complexity of bounded rationality is dependent on the structure
(and hence the complexity of) the environment. Collective decision-making
processes involving multiple local interactions can result in the emergence of
hierarchies. This reduces the Kolgomorov complexity of the system. Thus,
the ‘simplicity’ that we associate with bounded rationality in the form of
simplifying mechanisms such as satisficing is in fact crucial for the emergence
of complex systems.
A minority of economists have already begun incorporating some of these
insights in their work e.g. North (2005). The road ahead for those interested
to pursue their research along such lines will not be an easy one due the
number of disciplines outside economics that are involved, most of which are
unfamiliar to the average economists. However, the returns from learning
from these other disciplines are likely to be very large indeed.
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